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Today the price of a brand-new subcompact car is about 
$6,000 whereas the price of a two-year-old subcompact 
car with 30,000 miles of wear is about $4,000. This 
pattern of higher prices for new cars and lower prices for 
older cars is familiar and taken for granted by car owners. 
Today the price of a brand-new dollar bill is $1 (in the 
sense that you must give up $1 in some form to get a new 
dollar bill). Yet the price of a two-year-old tattered or worn 
dollar bill is also $1. This pattern of equal prices for new 
and old dollar bills is familiar and taken for granted by 
dollar bill owners. 
Cars and dollar bills can both be viewed as durable 
assets—physical objects that are produced at some ex-
pense and that, once produced, deliver a flow of services 
over time until they finally wear out. (Here the services are 
transportation and transactions.) Yet new cars sell at a 
premium over worn cars while new dollar bills trade 
without a premium for worn dollar bills. Why should two 
durable assets be priced so differently? 
An explanation, though not necessarily a good reason, 
for the difference is that cars, like most freely traded 
durable assets, are produced by the private sector while 
dollar bills and other forms of currency (bills and coins) are 
produced by the government. To cover costs and stay in 
business, automobile producers and dealers must charge 
more for new cars than worn cars. The U.S. government, 
however, in producing and selling new currency, need not 
worry about selling at a price that covers production costs 
because it can cover these costs with tax revenues.
1 So the 
government is free to exchange new and old bills one-for-
one, or in general to exchange units of currency according 
to their face values, which is known as par pricing of 
currency. 
The U.S. government has, of course, chosen to par 
price all bills and coins, regardless of denomination or 
physical composition as well as age, even though some 
bills and coins cost much more to produce than others. 
Whether or not this choice is the right one is, however, not 
clear. Par pricing definitely has flaws. According to 
economic theory, because par prices are not related to the 
costs of producing par-priced goods, par pricing almost 
certainly leads people to use too much of some goods. For 
currency, this means that almost the same level of 
transaction services might be obtained if other, less costly 
forms of money were used instead. But nonpar pricing of 
currency is not definitely better than par. Though it might 
improve the mix of currency, it would be much less 
convenient. If rates of exchange of different units of 
currency were not fixed by face values, then currency 
users would have to convert each of the different forms of 
currency into a standard unit of account, and the conver-
sion rates could change constantly. In terms of society's 
well-being, this added inconvenience could overwhelm the 
benefit of an improved mix. 
Unfortunately, no economic theory or evidence has yet 
established which of these arguments outweighs the other. 
We do think, though, that economists and the managers of 
the U.S. currency system (the Treasury and the Federal 
1 Seignorage alone, of course, more than covers the costs of adding to the stock 
of currency in circulation. Nonetheless, the government effectively finances 
currency production out of tax revenues. Seignorage is earned whenever the public 
buys an additional unit of unbacked government debt, not just when the debt 
instrument is a unit of currency. So the decision to issue the new unit of unbacked 
debt as currency is separate from the decision to issue the new unit of unbacked 
debt, and it is the latter that generates seignorage. Also, most currency is produced 
to replace worn-out currency, not to add to the stock of circulating currency. 
3 Reserve System) should seriously study some limited 
forms of nonpar pricing of currency. Par pricing of 
currency is, as we have noted, familiar, convenient, and 
largely taken for granted. However, it boosts the U.S. 
government's cost of providing currency, which now totals 
about $400 million annually. And its potential for leading 
to costly overproduction of some forms of currency has 
apparently been so great that it has already caused the 
managers of the U.S. currency system to fruitlessly spend 
money promoting the use of less expensive forms of 
currency and even to deviate from strict par pricing 
principles. (See the box accompanying this article.) Both 
theory and practice seem to imply that strict par pricing 
leaves room for improvement in the U.S. currency system. 
Room for Improvement Under Par Pricing 
A widely accepted definition of an economic improvement 
is a change that makes at least one person better off 
without making anyone worse off. According to economic 
theory, par pricing of any group of goods and services 
generally leads to patterns of production and use of those 
goods and services that can at least potentially be 
improved on in this sense. This theory seems to apply to 
U.S. currency. 
General Potential 
The potential to improve on the results of par pricing 
generally exists because, unlike nonpar pricing, this 
pricing system fails to equate the rates at which users are 
willing to exchange goods and services with the rates at 
which technology allows their exchange. 
Under a simple form of par pricing, for example, 
consumers could exchange any amount of one good or 
service in the par-priced group for an equal amount of any 
other good or service in the group.
2 Theory says this one-
for-one par price ratio would ultimately be the rate at 
which consumers would be willing to trade one par-priced 
good or service that they consume for any other. That is, 
being free to exchange goods and services in the par-priced 
group at the one-for-one ratio, consumers doing the best 
they could for themselves would adjust their use of these 
goods and services until giving up a unit in order to sell it 
and buy a unit of another would not make them any better 
off. Having exhausted all possibilities for improving their 
lot by exchanging goods and services at the par price ratio, 
consumers would be just willing to exchange them—that 
is, indifferent toward exchanging them—at this ratio. 
To preserve par prices among a group of goods and 
services, the amount of each good and service produced 
must exactly match the amount consumers want to have at 
these prices (the amount, in fact, which makes them 
indifferent toward exchanging at par price ratios). Other-
wise consumers would have more of some goods and 
services and less of others than the par prices had led them 
to want. These preferences would affect the relative prices 
of the goods and services. Consumers would bid up the 
prices of anything scarce until they were satisfied, that is, 
just willing to hold the amounts actually supplied. In other 
words, if par pricing is to be maintained, the supply of the 
goods and services involved must equal the demand at the 
par prices; otherwise the market will reject par pricing. 
That par prices and consumers' preferences determine 
the production of each par-priced good and service means 
that technology (or the way resources are used in produc-
tion) is irrelevant under par pricing. It affects neither 
prices, which are fixed at par, nor quantities consumed and 
produced, which are chosen by consumers based on the 
par prices. In private nonpar pricing markets, the forces of 
demand and supply make prices adjust to equate con-
sumers' willingness to exchange one good or service for 
another to producers' technological abilities to transform 
them. Obviously, this would not happen in par-priced 
markets. Instead, any relationship between consumer 
preferences and technology would be accidental and 
fleeting. No forces would act to align the rate at which 
production of one par-priced good or service could be 
increased if consumers gave up one unit of another (the 
marginal rate of transformation between the two) and the 
par price ratio at which consumers are indifferent about 
exchanging goods and services (the marginal rate of 
substitution). 
It is this almost certain divergence, under par pricing, 
between these marginal rates that creates the potential to 
improve on the results of par pricing. Under this system, 
almost certainly there will be some pair of goods or 
services such that producing one less of one of them would 
allow society to use the resources thus freed to produce 
more than one of the other. But since consumers will have 
adjusted to the one-for-one par price ratios, only one more 
unit of the other good or service will be needed to prevent 
anyone from being made worse off than before (that is, 
before the single unit of the first good or service was given 
up). The rest of the increased output of the other good or 
2Less simple examples would involve fixed but not necessarily one-for-one 
price ratios. Currency, which trades at face value ratios such as five $ 1 bills for one 
$5 bill, provides this sort of example. The arguments above can easily be modified 
for price ratios other than one-for-one. 
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service can thus be used to make at least one person better 
off. This result—no one worse off and at least someone 
better off—satisfies the common definition of an economic 
improvement. In saying that there is potential to improve 
on the results of par pricing, therefore, we mean that under 
par pricing there are almost certainly such rearrangements 
of the patterns of production and consumption that are 
technologically possible and would make at least one 
person better off without making anyone worse off. 
If such rearrangements are technologically possible, 
why should we call them only potential improvements? 
The reason, as we shall see, is that their potential to make 
someone better off without making anyone worse off is not 
realized unless some new system can bring about the 
rearrangement without itself generating side effects that 
negate the advantages of the rearrangement. 
Potential With U.S. Currency 
The logic of this general argument is perhaps clearest when 
it is applied to the familiar case of currency—and, in 
particular, U.S. currency. 
However, some care is necessary when making this 
application. In referring to currency as a commodity, we 
mean that the physical tokens—coins or bills—used to 
embody or signify ownership of the U.S. unit of account 
(the dollar) can be regarded as durable assets providing a 
stream of services (namely, proof of ownership) overtime. 
We do not view the abstract unit of account as a 
commodity. At the same time, it is units of account rather 
than their tokens that par pricing insures exchange one-for-
one. To preserve one-for-one exchange among the units of 
account they represent, coins and bills exchange at the 
ratio of their face values (for example, ten $1 bills for one 
$10 bill, a paper dollar for a dollar coin, two quarters for 
five dimes, and a worn-out bill for a new bill of the same 
denomination). 
Finally, since much of the information we have on 
currency technology is expressed in terms of the dollar 
costs of providing the various forms of currency, it will be 
convenient to note that the marginal rate of transformation 
between two goods is equivalent to the ratio of the two 
goods' marginal costs (the cost of producing an extra unit 
of one divided by the cost of producing an extra unit of the 
other). We can thus refer to the relative (marginal) costs 
of two forms of currency instead of to their marginal rate of 
transformation. 
Now we can describe more concretely the preferences 
consumers have for currency and its various forms, the 
relative costs of providing currency and its forms, and the 
reason par pricing of currency has led to patterns of 
production and use that can potentially be improved upon. 
• Preferences 
In choosing the total amount of currency they will hold, 
currency users weigh the relative advantages and disad-
vantages of currency and competing stores of wealth such 
as bank deposits, stocks and bonds, and commodities like 
metal. Currency has the advantage over many alternatives 
of being easy to carry and store, at least in small amounts. 
Because its face value is guaranteed by the government, 
currency can also be more convenient to pay (or accept in 
payment) than checks or credit, which often require that 
time and resources be devoted to verifying the payee's 
creditworthiness. Currency's disadvantages include its 
low rate of return (no interest or dividends); the risk that it 
will be irretrievably stolen or lost; and the inconvenience of 
carrying large amounts of it. 
In choosing the mixture of the various forms of 
currency they will hold, currency users weigh the relative 
advantages and disadvantages of the various forms. User 
preferences—shown, for example, in the reluctance with 
which many people accept $2 bills, Anthony dollars, and 
extremely worn or dirty currency—may reflect aesthetic 
feelings to some degree. However, they probably also 
reflect practical concerns about the relative convenience of 
holding and exchanging the various forms of currency. The 
inconveniences that currency users take into account when 
selecting a bundle of currency for the transactions they 
expect to make likely include the following: incurring ill 
will and spending time waiting for and counting change 
when a large denomination is exchanged for a low-cost 
item; not having the exact bills or coins when needed, such 
as for bus fare or coin- or bill-operated machines; having to 
carry large numbers of coins or small-denomination bills; 
losing money by misplacing coins or miscounting large 
amounts of change; losing money by erroneously accept-
ing the lower-valued or paying the higher-valued of two 
physically similar types of currency or losing time by 
having to more carefully check the value of units of 
currency; and having to separately store many different 
forms of currency, such as in a cash register drawer. 
• Costs 
The total annual costs of providing currency in the United 
States run at least into the hundreds of millions of dollars. 
In 1980, for example, the Federal Reserve System spent 
$200 million to provide paper currency, and the Treasury 
5 Department spent a like amount providing coins. This 
nearly $400 million annual expenditure included the costs 
of printing and minting currency; sorting circulated cur-
rency to remove unfit coins and bills and to group and store 
fit ones by type, as bags of quarters or bundles of $10 bills, 
for example; distributing new and sorted fit currency to the 
public; and destroying and disposing of unfit currency. 
A noteworthy feature of the costs of providing currency 
is that the relative costs of the various forms of paper 
currency are almost equal. Bills cost about two cents each 
to print, no matter what their face value. As a result, the 
cost of providing an extra ten units of account as ten $1 
bills, for example, is about ten times the cost of providing 
those units as one $10 bill. 
Another noteworthy feature of currency costs is that 
bills wear out much more quickly than coins and thus have 
to be replaced much more frequently. This advantage of 
coins is especially significant for small denominations, 
which change hands more often than large denominations 
and are thus subject to more intense wear. The advantages 
implies that, even if minting a coin of a small denomination 
costs more than printing a bill of the same denomination, 
over time the greater durability of the coin could make it a 
less expensive way to provide the denomination. 
• The Result of Missing Incentives 
Currency users choose the total amount and mixture of 
currency they hold so that, based on their view of the 
relative advantages and disadvantages of the various forms 
of currency and other stores of wealth, they are just willing 
to exchange units of currency at par price ratios. However, 
as we have seen, the par price ratios reflect only the face 
value of the forms of currency and are often far from equal 
to the relative costs of providing these forms, which (for 
bills especially) are more nearly independent of face value. 
As in the general case, this divergence between the rates at 
which users are willing to exchange and the rates at which 
technology can exchange creates the potential to rearrange 
currency production and use so as to make someone better 
off and no one worse off.
3 
The main source of the potential to improve on the total 
amount of currency in use is the fact that par pricing of old 
and new bills precludes pricing to cover the nonzero costs 
of providing new bills. As a result, currency users adjust to 
price ratios between currency and competing stores of 
wealth that may reflect (for example, through per check 
service charges) the costs of providing the competing 
stores of wealth but don't reflect the costs of providing 
currency. Currency users adjust the amount of currency 
they hold until they are just willing to give up a dollar of 
currency and convert it to whatever face value of a 
competing store of wealth it will buy (net of the service 
charges or other fees needed to cover the cost of providing 
the noncurrency). No users would be made worse off by 
such a rearrangement of their portfolio. Yet almost 
certainly, if it could be managed, such a rearrangement 
would permit resources to be freed from currency provi-
sion to provide other goods that could make at least 
someone better off. In this sense, too much currency is 
likely to be produced and used under a par pricing system. 
This possibility can be illustrated by returning to the 
comparison of auto and currency pricing. New car prices 
cover the costs of producing an extra car, and used car 
prices decline as the car wears out. From the perspective of 
society as a whole, trying to get the most from its 
resources, this type of pricing gives drivers an incentive to 
conserve on their use of both new and used cars, relative to 
competing means of transportation. Currency users have 
no comparable incentive to conserve on their use of 
currency, relative to competing means of exchange such as 
checks.
4 Whatever amount of any form of currency they 
want they can get at face value, without paying anything 
toward the costs of eventually replacing what they are 
using and wearing out. 
Par pricing leaves room to improve on the mixture as 
well as the amount of currency in use and for a similar 
reason. For example, a $10 bill, as indicated above, is 
produced with about the same amount of paper, ink, labor, 
and other inputs as a $ 1 bill, so that providing an extra ten 
$ 1 bills costs about ten times as much as providing an extra 
$10 bill. Under par pricing, however, the government is 
willing to exchange upon demand ten ones for a ten, and 
currency users adjust to this par price ratio until they too 
are just willing to exchange ten ones for a ten. A re-
3 Some readers may note that our assertion, here and elsewhere, that 
consumers' marginal rates of substitution equal the par price ratios is only true 
between pairs of goods that are both consumed. When one good in the pair is not 
consumed, an inequality results. This may raise concern over the validity of our 
argument for forms of currency (such as $2 bills or $ 1 coins) that circulate in small 
volume and are infrequently held by most currency users. Our argument can be 
modified to cover these forms, either by restricting the rearrangements of currency 
use to the set of users who do regularly handle these forms or by actually working 
with the inequalities. The modifications might reduce the size of the potential 
improvements over par pricing, but would not change our basic conclusions. 
4 To the extent that users of currency substitutes also do not directly pay for the 
costs of providing them (as, for example, in the case of so-called free checking), the 
potential for improving on the total amount of currency in use under par pricing is 
reduced; par pricing's incentive to overuse currency could be offset by these 
incentives to overuse the currency substitutes not being directly paid for. 
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arrangement that shows the potential for improvement in 
this case is for each currency user to substitute one more 
ten for ten less ones, which would leave each of them no 
worse off while freeing for other uses (to make someone 
better off) the resources that would have been used to 
provide the nine extra bills. 
Many similar examples come to mind, such as between 
coins and bills of the same face value, new coins or bills 
and old coins or bills, and coins or bills of differing face 
values. Appealing to the car analogy again, par pricing of 
the various forms of currency leads to the same kind of 
potential for improvement that would result if the govern-
ment bought and sold the various makes and models of 
new and used automobiles at price ratios that reflected 
only their relative seating capacity. 
Par's Limitations 
The managers of the U.S. currency system have recog-
nized the potential to improve on the existing patterns of 
currency production and use. However, par pricing limits 
their ability to achieve this potential and has recently 
thwarted several of their attempted rearrangements. 
Inadequate Tools 
Under par pricing the currency managers have only two 
policy tools for trying to rearrange the amount and mixture 
of currency in use, and both tools are inadequate. 
One tool is to introduce or promote substitute forms of 
currency that cost less to provide (at the margin) than the 
heavily used forms they are meant to replace. This tool is 
not very risky—or very powerful. The risk is limited to the 
expense of printing or minting and holding an inventory of 
the substitute bills and coins plus the cost of advertising 
and promoting them. Since no one will be forced to use the 
lower-cost substitutes, the worst that can happen is that 
users will in fact not use them (or not use more of them than 
before), leaving users individually no better or worse off 
than before but leaving the currency managers, and hence 
the taxpayers collectively, with a fruitless expenditure on 
currency inventory and advertising. The problem with this 
low-risk policy approach is that the worst it can produce is 
quite often exactly what it does produce. As long as par 
pricing is maintained, currency users have no incentive to 
decrease their holdings of existing higher-cost forms of 
currency or to begin holding new lower-cdst forms. Only if 
a new and less expensive to provide form of currency also 
gives users equivalent or better service than an existing 
form will it be accepted and thereby free resources from 
currency provision that can be used in another way to 
make people better off. 
The currency managers' other policy tool is to simply 
abolish an existing high-cost form of currency, forcing 
users to switch to lower-cost substitutes. While obviously 
powerful, this tool is also quite risky because whether so 
drastic a rearrangement in currency use would be an 
improvement is hard to determine. For small changes in 
the patterns of currency production and use, we can be 
confident that the well-being of currency users is little 
affected; before the small changes, remember, the freedom 
to exchange currency at par would have already made 
users just willing to trade small amounts of any one form of 
currency in their portfolio for the same face value of 
another. With the well-being of currency users unaffected, 
small changes would be improvements as long as they 
reduced even a small amount the resources devoted to 
currency provision. However, for large changes, such as 
the abolition of a popular but relatively expensive form of 
currency, we cannot safely assume that the well-being of 
currency users will be unaffected. Instead, their well-being 
would decline by an unknown amount, making it hard to 
know whether the resources the change freed from 
currency provision could be enough to both restore 
currency users' well-being and make someone better off. 
Historical Examples: The $1 Bill 
and Its Cheaper Substitutes 
Faced with this uncertainty, the U.S. currency managers 
seem to have been reluctant to abolish popular but 
relatively expensive forms of currency. In the case of the 
$1 bill, for example, the managers have repeatedly relied 
only on their first tool—offering cheaper substitutes. Their 
repeated failures to get consumers to switch to these 
substitutes illustrate how hard it is to achieve the potential 
for an economic improvement under a par pricing system. 
Because U.S. $1 bills are heavily used and wear out 
quickly, they are an expensive form of currency. The 
Bureau of Printing and Engraving prints and distributes 
over 2 billion new $ 1 notes each year at a cost of about 2 
cents each, or over $40 million total, and on average those 
bills last only 1.5 years. The same face value of currency 
now supplied by $1 bills could be supplied at less expense 
by half as many $2 bills. Alternatively, savings could be 
achieved by replacing $1 bills by $1 coins, which cost 
about 50 percent more initially but last many times longer. 
At least three times in this century, these potential 
advantages of the $2 bill and the $1 coin have prompted 
the currency managers to offer them to the public at par as 
7 substitutes for the $1 bill. In each case the public spurned 
the substitutes. 
• The $2 Bill 
In 1924 the Treasury faced a problem of increasing costs 
associated with the issue, redemption, and replacement of 
$1 bills. It tried to get enough $2 bills into circulation to 
reduce the number of $1 bills outstanding by half, but as 
economist Neil Carothers (1930, p. 296) observed, it 
failed. 
The circulation of the two denominations is undesirable. 
They are confused in change operations, and their joint 
circulation is a cause of dispute, annoyance, and occasional 
fraud. The $2 notes are accepted reluctantly, passed on 
quickly, and driven back to banks and Treasury offices. 
Based on these observations of users' resistance to the new 
bills, Carothers (1930, p. 297) framed the Treasury's 
options under par pricing: 
There are two possible solutions. One is to abolish the $2 note 
and provide an adequate number of $1 bills regardless of 
expense. The other solution, more drastic but more funda-
mental, is to abolish the $1 note. 
The Treasury did not formally adopt either of these 
solutions until 1965, when it stopped providing $2 bills. 
The public, however, effectively solved the problem of 
joint circulation by choosing to use almost no $2 bills. 
Almost exactly 50 years after this episode, the 
Treasury was again concerned with the growing cost of 
providing $1 bills. Studies indicated that the government 
could save several million dollars and postpone a major 
capital investment in currency production facilities if 
currency users would accept $2 bills in place of ones. 
The Treasury apparently hoped that an advertising 
campaign could reverse its previous failure and persuade 
the 1970s public to accept twos. One study which 
influenced the decision to reissue $2 bills noted that the 
"public has an inherent dislike for the two dollar bill" but 
concluded that this dislike was based on "correctable 
misconceptions" that could be dispelled with an appro-
priate educational campaign (Axelrod et al. 1975, pp. 4, 
5). 
Based on the potential cost savings and the hope that 
advertising could overcome the public's reluctance, the 
decision was made to reissue the $2 bill as part of the 
nation's bicentennial celebration (in 1976). As in the 
1920s, however, the results disappointed the currency 
managers. A total of only 575 million of the new $2 bills 
were eventually printed, far fewer than the more than 2 
billion $1 bills printed annually. A substantial portion of 
the twos remained in storage in the Federal Reserve 
System, while the number of $1 bills in circulation 
continued to grow rapidly. Without an incentive to switch 
from $1 bills to $2 bills, the public was unswayed by 
advertising and again rejected the less expensive form of 
currency, which may indicate that dislike of $2 bills 
reflects more than misconceptions. 
• The $1 Coin 
Even as the U.S. public was rejecting the bicentennial $2 
bill, the currency managers prepared to introduce the 
Anthony dollar coin, another lower-cost substitute for $1 
bills. The managers were attracted to the idea of the 
Anthony dollar because, although these coins are actually 
more expensive to produce than dollar bills (3 cents each 
versus 2), they wear out so much more slowly that, if 
generally accepted, they could save tens of millions of 
dollars each year. 
A study prepared before the introduction of the new 
coins (Martin 1979) warned the currency managers that 
they could expect no better luck with Anthony dollars than 
with $2 bills. The study raised doubts that mere exhorta-
tion would get the dollar coin into circulation, noting that 
"there is a serious question whether the consumer or 
general public will accept the argument of a government 
cost saving as 'the reason for' the new one dollar coin" 
(Martin 1979, p. 16). The study also repeated two 
traditional explanations for the unpopularity of dollar 
coins—consumers don't like to carry coins in general (and 
large-denomination coins especially), and dollar coins 
pose serious problems in retail trade because most cash 
register drawers don't have a separate compartment for 
them. Finally, the study pointed out that the physical 
characteristics of the Anthony dollar would reduce its 
chances of public acceptance. The Anthony dollar is 
distinctly smaller than previous dollar coins, such as the 
silver dollars of the nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
turies and the more recent Eisenhower dollar. This 
smallness is an advantage, for one of the reasons why those 
earlier dollar coins did not circulate much is the incon-
venience of carrying such large and heavy pieces. How-
ever, the smallness is a serious disadvantage as well. 
Along with the coin's round shape and silver color, the 
smallness makes it easy to mistake the coin for a mere 
8 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Spring 1984 
quarter.
5 
The authors of the study actually recommended forcing 
the Anthony dollar into circulation by simultaneously 
abolishing $ 1 bills, but the currency managers rejected this 
advice.
6 In 1979, the new coin was introduced, advertised, 
and promoted, but the public was permitted to freely 
exchange $1 bills and coins at par. 
As the study had predicted, the results were almost 
identical to those of the bicentennial $2 bill. The public 
continued to carry $1 bills, well over half of the new coins 
wound up as inventory in the Federal Reserve System, 
many never made it into circulation at all, and production 
of the Anthony dollar was essentially halted in 1980. 
Uncertain Alternatives 
to Par Pricing 
If par pricing leads to patterns of currency production and 
use that can at least potentially be improved on, yet that 
potential doesn't seem able to be achieved under par 
pricing, can it be under some form of nonpar pricing? The 
answer is not clear. 
Under par pricing we can identify rearrangements of 
existing patterns of currency production and use that 
would be economic improvements. They would, that is, 
free enough resources from currency provision to produce 
enough other goods and services to both compensate 
currency users for any loss of well-being associated with 
their switch to the new amount and mixture of currency 
and make at least someone better off. The problem under 
par pricing is that such potentially superior rearrange-
ments usually can't be made; the currency managers' 
tools—offering substitutes or abolishing existing forms of 
currency—are inadequate. 
Nonpar pricing gives the currency managers more 
flexibility—through pricing—to offer the incentives neces-
sary to bring about at least some of these rearrangements. 
However, nonpar pricing has side effects—the increased 
transaction costs associated with a more complicated 
currency pricing system—that may offset the potential 
improvement of the rearrangements. That is, nonpar 
pricing probably can bring about rearrangements that free 
enough resources from currency provision to compensate 
currency users for just the change in the amount and 
mixture of currency they hold. But these rearrangements 
may or may not free enough resources to compensate 
currency users for both that change and the extra incon-
venience they experience in transacting with nonpar-
priced currency. 
A Powerful Tool: Pricing 
Unlike par pricing, which refers to a single specific 
system, nonpar pricing refers to any of many possible 
alternatives. In particular, it allows the currency managers 
to charge different prices for units of account depending on 
which forms of currency they are embodied in. The 
managers may charge, for example, more or less for a 
dollar coin than for a dollar bill and more or less for five $ 1 
bills than for one $5 bill. Alternatively, they may limit (or 
ration) the supply of some forms of currency and let 
currency users determine its price in the marketplace. 
Although nonpar pricing gives the currency managers 
flexibility in pricing currency, it gives them no direct 
control over the prices at which currency users will 
actually trade currency. Nonetheless, it seems likely that, 
by linking the managers' prices for the various forms of 
currency to the relative costs of providing these forms, the 
managers could induce users to make at least some 
improving rearrangements in currency production and 
use. Other improvements might be brought about by 
rationing relatively expensive forms of currency. 
Side Effects 
Despite the room it leaves for improvement, par pricing is 
a very convenient system for currency users. Under it, 
rates of exchange among forms of currency are well known 
and easy to calculate. Prices and contracts can be specified 
in units of account—dollars and cents—without much 
attention to the rates at which the various forms of 
currency will be accepted as payment. Furthermore, under 
par pricing, currency users are not exposed to exchange 
rate risk, or the possibility that the value of the forms of 
U. S. currency they hold will decline relative to other forms 
of that currency. In short, the agreement that par pricing 
5 The study's conclusion was supported by historical precedent. In the last half 
of the nineteenth century, for example, the U.S. currency system contained a 3-
cent piece and a 20-cent piece in addition to the still familiar 1 5-, 10-, and 25-cent 
pieces. However, "the public chose the silver dime, the copper-nickel 5 cent piece, 
and the bronze 1 cent piece as the only coins required in transactions involving less 
than 25 cents" (Carothers 1930, p. 273). The case of the 20-cent piece is 
especially interesting. This coin was issued in 1875, not to reduce costs but to 
facilitate the transition in the West from Spanish and Mexican currency to U.S. 
currency (Carothers 1930, pp. 261-62). It was issued, however, without 
withdrawing the quarter dollar, a piece similar in size and value to the new coin. 
Apparently the resulting confusion caused limited circulation of the new coin, and 
Congress withdrew it after only three years. 
6 There was a historical precedent in this regard also. In 1924 Secretary of the 
Treasury Andrew Mellon proposed as a solution to the mounting costs of 
supplying $1 bills that those bills be abolished and the public be forced to use the 
silver dollars then languishing in the Treasury's vaults. His proposal was not 
accepted. 
9 insures between the face and market values of various 
forms of currency simplifies trade. 
Some, and perhaps many, of these conveniences would 
be lost under nonpar pricing. The exact loss would depend 
on the exact nonpar system chosen, but some of the 
potential inconveniences of nonpar pricing of currency can 
be identified by first considering how nonpar pricing works 
for other durable assets, such as our durable example, 
automobiles. 
Generally, if auto A costs more to produce than auto B, 
auto A will also cost more to buy. Some consumers choose 
to pay the higher cost of auto A because they expect, in one 
way or another, to get their money's worth from it. They 
may expect to keep their auto A until it wears out, thinking 
that its better performance or longer life, compared to the 
cheaper auto B, will compensate them for the extra money 
they spent on it. Alternatively, they may expect to keep 
their auto A for only a while, enjoying its better perfor-
mance and then selling it. In this case, the likely resale 
price of their auto A is an important factor in the decision 
to buy it. Because even a used auto A should perform 
better or last longer than an auto B with the same mileage 
and history of use, resale prices will also be higher for auto 
A than for auto B, partially compensating buyers of auto A 
for its higher initial price. 
Now suppose that dollar bills and dollar coins were 
priced like automobiles. A new dollar bill might sell at face 
value ($ 1) plus its cost of printing ($.02), or $ 1.02. A new 
dollar coin, because of its higher production cost ($.03 for 
minting), would sell for more, or $1.03. Almost no users 
would buy either a bill or a coin with the thought of keeping 
it until it wears out, so the appropriate analogy is to an 
automobile which is resold before it wears out With 
currency just as with cars, some consumers would buy the 
higher-priced form (dollar coins) despite its higher price if 
that form were either sufficiently more convenient than or 
had sufficiently higher resale value than the other (dollar 
bills). Again, the resale values of individual units would 
decline gradually as the units wore out. 
In this system, many of the conveniences of par pricing 
would obviously be lost Fixed rates of exchange among 
units of currency would be lost; bills and coins of various 
degrees of wear would take on relative values that would 
depend on those degrees. Therefore, to get full value from 
their currency in this system, currency users would have to 
determine the exact stage of wear of each bill or coin they 
encountered and calculate its exact current value, perhaps 
to many decimal places. Besides that, no longer would all 
Superf it Bills Bend Par Pricing 
Strict par pricing does not permit the currency managers to limit 
the use of high-quality (new, expensive) currency by either 
rationing or surcharges. For many years, good luck—in the form 
of widespread public indifference about the quality of U.S. 
bills—permitted the managers to maintain a nearly cost-
minimizing level of bill quality in spite of par pricing However, 
the spread of cash handling machines, which work best with very 
high-quality, or superfit, bills, may be bringing the managers' 
lucky streak to an end. 
Cost vs. Quality 
As it exchanges a large volume of currency with the private 
sector, the Federal Reserve System monitors and maintains the 
quality of the nation's circulating currency. When a bank 
deposits currency at the Fed, the bills and coins are examined for 
wear and tear. Those that are judged to be below minimum 
quality are destroyed and, if necessary, replaced with new bills or 
coins provided by the U.S. Treasury. The remaining fit bills are 
sorted by type and denomination, bundled, and stored until there 
is a demand for them again. 
In this system, the choice of a minimum quality standard for 
currency is critical. It affects not only the quality of the circulating 
currency but also the cost of the Fed's sorting activity and the 
number—and hence the cost—of replacement bills and coins 
required from the Treasury. 
The relationship between the level of these costs and the level 
of minimum fitness can be thought of as a U-shaped curve. For 
the partly mechanized technology in use since the mid-1970s, 
any reduction in the minimum quality standard causes the Fed's 
cost of sorting currency to increase and, below some point, to 
increase rapidly. This is mainly because the people and machines 
that sort currency can process high-quality currency faster than 
low-quality currency. Unlike the Fed's sorting cost, the Trea-
sury's cost of providing replacement currency decreases as the 
minimum quality of currency is reduced, but it increases rapidly 
as minimum quality standards are raised. This is because a lower 
standard means that bills and coins last longer and are replaced 
less frequently. Combined sorting and replacement costs rise 
rapidly for either extremely low or extremely high minimum 
fitness levels. 
units of currency function as units of account; their dollar 
values would vary with wear. In an uncertain world, where 
demand for bills and coins of various ages would be 
unpredictable, the relative exchange value of two used bills 
or coins would also be unpredictable. In short, trade under 
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Technology vs. Luck 
By influencing the quality of circulating currency, the minimum 
fitness level also affects the benefits the public derives from 
currency. Currency of very low quality is aesthetically dis-
pleasing to some, difficult to count and handle, and unsuited to 
certain uses, such as in vending machines or other mechanical 
currency processors. 
Above a certain level of quality, however, further increases in 
the quality of currency—and hence in the minimum fitness 
level—usually don't matter very much to most people. For many 
years, in fact, most people did seem to be indifferent about bills 
within a broad range of quality levels. This allowed the currency 
managers to select a minimum level of bill quality which came 
close to minimizing quality-related costs. If people had not been 
so indifferent, they could have driven lower-quality bills out of 
circulation and raised the effective minimum bill quality to an 
expensive level, for maintaining par pricing in the face of a strong 
public preference for superfit bills would require a sharp increase 
in the costs of printing replacement bills. In a par pricing system, 
where currency users don't bear the increased printing costs, 
such a preference for superfit bills would produce a large 
potential for economic improvement (which could be realized by 
lowering the minimum quality level of bills). 
The rapid spread of automatic teller machines (ATMs) and 
other cash handling machines in the last few years may be 
creating just such a public preference for superfit bills. The 
number of ATMs alone reached almost 24,000 by mid-1982 
and has been doubling about every two years (Bradley 1982). 
These machines work best with either new or superfit bills; bills 
near the current minimal quality level or even bills of average 
quality can jam the machines. Therefore, ATM owners—chiefly 
banks and other financial depository institutions—have a rapidly 
growing demand for bundles of either new or superfit currency.
1 
Perhaps because accommodating this demand would drive 
printing costs up sharply, the currency managers have so far 
refused to guarantee the availability of bills sorted by quality. The 
managers have instead instructed the Federal Reserve Banks 
that requests for replacement currency, including bills, "be filled 
according to the inventory of cash on hand and that reusable 
currency and coin be paid out before the new uncirculated items 
are distributed" (FRB 1981, p. 4). In other words, banks and 
other ATM owners who order bills from the Fed usually receive 
nonpar pricing would be more complicated and less 
convenient than under par pricing. 
Questionable Results 
The greater transaction costs associated with nonpar 
bundles of mixed quality, ranging from new and superfit to barely 
minimal. If the owners need only high-quality bills for their 
ATMs, they have to sort out these bills themselves. 
Although this policy has prevented currency printing cost 
increases, strictly speaking it is a deviation from par pricing The 
managers are refusing to exchange at face value ratios two 
existing forms of currency—low-quality and high-quality notes. 
Economic theory suggests that the managers' policy should lead 
to both private sorting of bills and private premiums on sorted 
bills to pay for the cost of sorting Private sorting is certainly 
occurring, for the ATMs are being stocked primarily with high-
quality notes. Private premiums are almost as certainly being 
paid for these high-quality notes, though the form of payment 
may not be very noticeable yet
2 To the extent that premiums are 
being paid, par pricing has broken down further, and the rapid 
spread of ATMs may erode it still further. The threat of rapidly 
rising printing costs may make the currency managers unwilling 
to preserve par pricing by supplying bundles of high-quality 
currency at par, and any scheme by the managers to charge more 
for bundles of high-quality bills would amount to an open and 
official abandonment of par pricing. 
The managers' strategy in this situation currently seems to be 
to ask for technological changes that would bring back the kind of 
indifference about bill quality that for many years allowed them 
to both par price and choose a nearly cost-minimizing level of bill 
quality. Apparently the managers have suggested that manufac-
turers should develop new ATMs that can use lower-quality bills 
than today's machines can (Bradley 1982). Without such 
machines, the currency managers may face the choice of either 
incurring large cost increases or continuing to deviate from strict 
par pricing of bills. 
IThis preference apparently does not extend to bundles that mix new and 
superfit currency. Many ATMs can be set to run on either new or superfit bills (the 
switching procedure takes about three minutes), but not on a mixture of both 
(Bradley 1982). 
2 Some reasons such premiums might be hard to detect are that they could be 
lumped in with other fees or be paid in kind rather than cash. For example, they 
might take the forms of slight additions to existing costs of access to ATMs or, in 
the interbank market, long delays by one bank in filling orders by another bank for 
high-quality notes unless the ordering bank made enough concessions in other 
matters (for example, correspondent balances) to cover the costs of this service. 
pricing cast doubt on the relative advantages of this type of 
system in at least two ways. They limit the types of nonpar 
pricing that currency users would likely practice and thus 
the types of rearrangements in currency use that nonpar 
pricing can actually bring about. And for any rearrange-
11 ment that nonpar pricing can bring about, they raise the 
possibility that the additional inconvenience of nonpar 
pricing itself outweighs any gain from the rearrangement
7 
Certainly, the inconvenience of nonpar pricing limits 
the forms of nonpar pricing that currency users would 
practice. This is not very limiting for expensive goods such 
as automobiles; for them, the time and effort spent to 
determine the exact quality and value of the goods being 
bought or sold would be small relative to their differences 
in value.
8 However, many goods that are less expensive to 
produce (and accordingly have lower price differentials) 
are not priced in as much detail as they could be. Meat 
prices, for example, vary by the official grade of the meat 
sold, but the true quality of meat actually varies somewhat 
within each grade. The cost of grading meat more 
precisely—creating more, narrower grades—could easily 
exceed the gains that more precise meat pricing would 
bring about In the same way that meat buyers and sellers 
choose to recognize only a few quality and price classes for 
meat, buyers and sellers of currency in a nonpar system 
would likely recognize only a few classes of wornness and 
prices for coins and bills. In fact, given the relatively small 
cost differences (and hence probably small price dif-
ferences) between the quality classes, they might even 
decide that keeping track of any classes would not be worth 
their trouble. 
By limiting the forms of nonpar pricing that currency 
users would practice, the inconvenience of nonpar pricing 
makes some rearrangements of currency use impossible. It 
can also cause the currency managers' nonpar prices to 
have unintended deleterious effects. For example, sup-
pose the currency managers decided to sell new currency 
at face value plus cost of production, which would be 
analogous to the pricing of new automobiles. Suppose also 
that currency users found all forms of nonpar pricing 
inconvenient and effectively imposed par pricing in the 
market for used currency. Buyers of new currency would 
know that they would later receive only face value for 
whatever they buy. Then they would, for example, avoid 
Anthony dollars, which would cost more than paper 
dollars, even more than they avoid them now under par 
pricing.
9 So this official pricing policy, though designed to 
encourage currency users to conserve on their use of 
expensive forms of currency in the same way that nonpar 
pricing of automobiles encourages drivers to conserve on 
their use of expensive automobiles, would backfire: if 
combined with a choice of par pricing by the currency 
users, it would cause U.S. currency users to choose more, 
not less, of the relatively expensive dollar bills. Other 
official nonpar pricing systems could be similarly thwarted 
by the public's complete or partial unwillingness to price 
currency at nonpar ratios. This is one reason why the 
inconvenience of par pricing makes it hard to determine 
whether nonpar pricing systems would actually improve 
the U.S. currency system. 
For those rearrangements of currency use that the 
currency managers could bring about with nonpar pricing, 
the uncertainty over the relative advantages of nonpar 
pricing is simply a difficult empirical question. Can 
currency users be compensated for the added inconve-
niences of nonpar pricing as well as for their switch to a 
possibly less preferred mixture of currency with the new 
goods and services produced from the resources that the 
rearrangement freed from currency provision? We know 
of no studies that answer this question, and we regard the 
relative advantages of par and nonpar pricing of currency 
as simply unknown at this time. 
Options Worth Studying 
Par pricing of currency can potentially be improved on, but 
nonpar pricing is less convenient and, as a result, may not 
actually be better. What should the currency managers 
do? Because par pricing of currency is familiar and widely 
accepted and because currency provision accounts for a 
small proportion of the federal budget, it might seem that 
they should simply heed a new version of the old saying: 
"If you're not sure it's broken, don't fix it" We tend to 
agree with this advice, for we are not convinced that any 
major change in our currency system should be made now. 
We also recognize that changes have to be carefully 
considered, for misguided reforms could easily do more 
harm than good. 
7 We ignore some other doubts about whether a change to nonpar pricing of 
currency would actually improve the patterns of currency production and use—for 
example, whether the increased production of other goods made possible by the 
resources freed from currency provision actually would be distributed to currency 
users so as to make them no worse off and whether the economy has other resource 
mis allocations that happen to be offset more effectively by par than by nonpar 
pricing of currency (the so-called problem of the second best). Unlike the doubts 
we discuss in the text, these are general doubts that apply to almost all economic 
changes; they seem to have no special relevance to the currency system. 
8 However, when the inconvenience of ascertaining the quality of an 
automobile does become large relative to the price of the automobile, the volume of 
trading in automobiles may vary inversely with quality. See Akerlof 1970. 
9 First users of currency might be willing to take some losses of this type. A 
bank, for example, might take these losses as a service to its retail customers, who 
might in turn compensate the bank through a hidden fee, such as a below-market 
rate of return on deposits. 
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We do think, however, that improvements over the 
existing U. S. par pricing system are possible and should be 
seriously investigated. Examples such as the $ 1 bill and its 
cheaper substitutes show that this nation has an already 
significant potential to improve on existing patterns of 
currency production and use and that this potential can't 
be achieved under par pricing. Furthermore, changes in 
technology, resource availability, or currency user likes 
and dislikes can, by altering the relative costs of or the 
demands for the various forms of currency, cause this 
potential to quickly increase. In fact, this has happened 
twice recently: a surge in the cost of copper temporarily 
made pennies much more expensive, and the spread of 
automatic teller machines (ATMs) has boosted the de-
mand for high-quality bills. In both cases the managers 
responded by quietly introducing rationing—a hidden 
form of nonpar pricing—into our currency system. (See 
the accompanying box for a discussion of the case of high-
quality bills.
10) Open and official nonpar pricing of 
currency should at least be studied in order to better 
understand the currency system we already have and the 
one we perhaps should have. 
The current lack of empirical and theoretical knowl-
edge about the inconveniences of nonpar pricing implies 
that, in studying nonpar alternatives, economists will 
initially have to turn to introspection and common sense 
for guidance. One practical criterion for evaluating nonpar 
pricing proposals is that at a minimum they should not 
backfire. That is, nonpar pricing systems should not 
worsen the pattern of currency production and use (by 
making currency less convenient or more expensive, 
without offsetting gains) even if, as is quite possible, 
currency users choose to practice in trades among them-
selves either par pricing or a more limited form of nonpar 
pricing than the currency managers practice in their trades 
with currency users. Beside rationing, which the currency 
managers have already used with some success, we think 
that at least two other types of nonpar pricing might meet 
this criterion. 
First-User Premiums 
The essence of first-user premium schemes is for the 
currency managers, when selling currency to depository 
institutions, to place modest surcharges on expensive 
forms of currency. The depository institutions paying 
these surcharges then would be free to price their currency 
as they saw fit. Although the exact effects of such schemes 
would depend on how the private sector decided to price 
the expensive forms of currency, appropriate first-user 
charges seem to create a no-lose situation for the currency 
managers. On the one hand, if the modest surcharges, 
however passed on in the private sector, caused a 
significant shift from expensive to less expensive forms of 
currency, then the public's preference for the expensive 
form was probably not strong enough to justify the extra 
expense of providing it in its previous quantities. On the 
other hand, if the public did not significantly decrease its 
use of the expensive form of currency, then the modest 
surcharge could be defended as an efficient tax, for it 
would raise revenue without strongly influencing the 
economy's allocation of resources. 
The appropriate pattern of surcharges need not re-
semble the pattern of premiums on new units of currency in 
the ideal pricing-like-autos scheme. Those premiums 
would reflect the relative costs of printing or minting new 
currency, so that the premium on a new dollar coin would 
be higher than the premium on a new dollar bill. The first-
user surcharges could, by contrast, reflect something like 
the relative annual average costs of keeping the stock of 
each form of currency in circulation, so that the great 
durability of the dollar coin would earn it a smaller 
surcharge than the short-lived dollar bill, for example. As 
long as the first-user premiums were small (that is, less 
than the cost of producing a unit of currency) and were 
higher on more expensive than on less expensive forms of 
currency, the no-lose situation would seem to hold. 
Setting surcharges in this way would yield a more 
practical system than the pricing-like-autos system. With 
these surcharges, the first user of currency distributed by 
the currency managers would have an incentive to choose 
the less expensive forms of currency even if par pricing in 
the private sector prevented the currency managers' prices 
from being passed on to subsequent users. Banks would get 
$1 coins or $2 bills at more favorable rates than $1 bills, 
giving them an incentive to in turn encourage their 
customers to accept the less expensive forms. ATM 
owners could get all the high-quality notes they wanted, 
though at a fee. Par pricing would probably still predomi-
nate in private transactions, or at least the deviations might 
be subtle, with slight discounts and surcharges for use of 
the various forms of currency being bundled into other 
lOThe penny shortage of the late 1970s and the early 1980s seems to have 
been resolved by a combination of luck—a fall in the price of copper—and action 
by the currency managers, who since 1982 have been phasing out the copper 
penny, replacing it with the cheaper copper-zinc penny, and increasing supply to 
meet the demand at par (Dorfman 1982). 
13 charges, such as correspondent balances, check cashing 
fees, or cash card fees, on an average cost basis. The 
private sector is already coping in this way with some 
deviations from par pricing of currency, including the 
refusal of the currency managers to supply on demand 
bundles of superfit bills (see the box) as well as the Federal 
Reserve System's policy of charging for physical delivery 




Another nonpar option worthy of serious study is for U.S. 
currency managers to follow the lead of countries which 
use lotteries to promote the sale of government debt. 
Purchasers of the debt receive numbered bonds that entitle 
them to a certain sum of cash in the future as well as a 
chance to win a jackpot if the serial number of one of their 
bonds is selected in a drawing. Some U.S. banks have 
acted similarly when promoting the use of their ATMs 
with random rewards by, for example, mixing a few $20 
bills into the piles of $5 bills that the machines dispense 
(Curley 1982). Such schemes might overcome the barrier 
of habit which seems to hinder the introduction of new 




 Suppose, for example, that the managers 
sought to circulate their large inventory of $2 bills by 
running a lottery on the serial numbers of these bills. Some 
problems would have to be solved,
1
3
 but as long as the 
amount of money spent on the lottery were less than the 
amount the managers saved through reduced circulation of 
the expensive $1 bill, the currency system might be 
improved. 
Concluding Remarks 
Although the relative advantages of par and nonpar pricing 
systems for currency are still uncertain, some nonpar 
pricing plans seem worthy of at least further exploration. 
Such exploration might not be supported by those who 
believe that currency is inherently a public service that 
should be financed by general tax revenues rather than by 
user fees. However, even if it can be shown that currency 
provision is properly a public enterprise, it does not follow 
that currency must be priced at par. 
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